Universalism? Some Really Bad People Don't Seem To Ever Change

I am very sympathetic to the universalist position which says that at the end of the day all human beings will enter heaven, even if only after aeons of purgation (whether this view is compatible with Catholicism is another story). But at the same time empirically I know some people who don't change their wicked ways, no matter what happens to them or how much loving help they receive. I know some people who have had really traumatic things happen to them, things which should have changed them for the better, but they still continue on in their wickedness and show no inclination to change for the better. I am not confident that for such people extending their existence for aeons will incline them to change for the better, rather than for the worse. The disturbing fact is that there are some truly devilish people out there who simply don't seem like they'll ever change. But at the same time I know that God's capacity to change even the most darkened of hearts is not bound by my concievability. In the end, it seems to me that since God is a maximally great being, his love will pursue us forever. And who can run away from the love of God forever?

Must Any Omnipotent and Omniscient Entity be Omnibenevolent?

It seems plausible to me that any entity that is omnipotent and omniscient has to be omnibenevolent.

Here's my reasoning: I think every person qua person is at least mildly inclined towards that which he believes is the morally best choice (where 'best choice' here is defined as a choice such that there is no better). To be sure, this inclination may be very small, and it is certainly overcome in many of us by overriding inclinations, but it is nonetheless there. So any omnipotent and omniscient agent OO, qua personal agent, has to have this inclination as well. Now what are things that can cause a person's inclination to that which one thinks is best to be overridden? It seems to me that it is either (i) ignorance, (ii) passions, (iii) coercion, or (iv) desire for personal gain. (Help me out if you think there is something else).

My inclination to do that which I think the best choice may be overridden by my inclination to not do it because of ignorance -- I may falsely believe there is a better choice. Bob's inclination towards being faithful to his spouse may be overridden by his (sexual) passions to sleep with his physically attractive colleague. Mary's inclination to tell the police what she saw at a crime scene may be overcome by peer pressure or coercion from her criminal friends. Judge Stephen's inclination to render an impartial verdict in a very public court case may be swayed by his desire for fame (personal gain). All of these things may cause our inclination to that which is best, which we have by nature, to be overridden. But the thing is that none of (i) - (iv) can override OO's inclination to do that which is best. He cannot choose something under the mistaken impression that it is the best choice because he, by stipulation, cannot be mistaken -- he is omniscient. This entity also cannot be subject to his passions because he is omnipotent. Furthermore, it seems that any omnipotent and omniscient being has to be immaterial anyways, and so won't be subject to passions (any material entity will be subject to physical laws and will have his capacity for knowledge limited by physical constraints). And obviously an omnipotent being cannot be coerced, or be subject to peer pressure. And with respect to personal gain, an omnipotent being already has everything he needs, so he won't act out of personal gain. So any omnipotent and omniscient being OO has to be omnibenevolent as well -- i.e., any such being has to be all good. Q.E.D.

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The following is a good representation of the argument in a numbered-premise-to-conclusion format:

1. Any agent A has an inclination towards that which it perceives to be morally best.

2. Any agent that is omnipotent and omniscient has no overriding inclinations against doing that which it perceives to be morally best.

3. If (1) and (2), then any omnipotent and omniscient agent would be omnibenevolent.

Therefore:

4. Any omnipotent and omniscient agent is omnibenevolent.

Robin Dembroff Paper Parody, Inspired by Anscombe

The nerve of Dembroff and Wodak (2018) is that <we have a negative duty to not use any gender-specific pronouns to refer to anyone, regardless of their gender identity>. While there may be much to be said for this view, still it does not seem right on the face of it.

Traditional Theism and the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic

It is interesting to note that traditional theism is incompatible with the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic. Personally, I do not think that this is a problem for the theist since SQML has unacceptable implications —like the idea that everything that exists must exist. In any case, here is one proof that traditional theism, which entails that (i) possibly, only God exists, is incompatible with SQML. 

Take a Quantificational Modal Logical System that includes Brouwer, and allows free variables. Call such a system SQML- (since it is slightly weaker than SQML). It is a theorem of such a system that <If possibly, only one thing exists, then only one thing actually exists.>

Informal Proof: Suppose that there is a possible world W at which only one thing exists. So at W it is true that x=y. The necessity of identity states that ∀x∀y(x = y → □(x = y)). So it follows that (x=y) → □(x=y). But by Modus Ponens, it follows that □(x=y). But by Brouwer, it follows that x=y is true at @. 



[1][2]

Even if one thinks that abstract objects necessarily exist along with God, or that God has proper parts, ~TT is still a theorem of SQML-. This is at least because TT entails that (ii) possibly, the only essentially minded entity that exists is God, and (iii) possibly, something is essentially minded and numerically distinct from God.^[3]

(Very) Informal Proof: BF, CBF, and □NE are all theorems of SQML- (cf. Menzel SEP proofs). So it is a theorem of SQML- that if something exists at a possible world, then it exists necessarily (i.e., there are no contingent entities). Given this and (ii), it follows that necessarily, some minded entity exists that is numerically distinct from God. This contradicts (i). So ~TT.

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[1] Although this would normally not be licit, since the domain at w is just a singleton set, this is in fact a licit move.

[2] Kripke proved this follows from QML and the premise that □∀x□(x = x). And this premise is actually a theorem of SQML-. Observe: ∀x(x = x). By the Rule of Necessitation (RN), it follows that □∀x(x = x). By Converse Barcan Formula (CBF), which is a theorem of SQML-, it follows that □∀x(x = x) →  ∀x□(x = x). So it follows by Modus Ponens that ∀x□(x = x). But by RN it follows that □∀x□(x = x).                                   

[3] Trinitarians can read (i)-(ii) as follows: (i) possibly, the only essentially minded entities that exist are the Father (F), Son (S), and Holy Spirit (HS); (ii) Possibly, something is essentially minded and numerically distinct from F, S, and HS. The proof would still, mutatis mutandis, go through.

Atheists and Agnostics Tend To Be Smarter Than Religious People

From my anecdotal experience, the average atheist and agnostic is more intelligent and has greater general knowledge than the average religious person. That's just from my experience. But there is also evidence from empirical studies that substantiates this as well.

For example, here is the abstract of the meta-analytic study discussed by Russia Today:

Abstract

**A meta-analysis of 63 studies showed a significant negative association between intelligence and religiosity.** The association was stronger for college students and the general population than for participants younger than college age; it was also stronger for religious beliefs than religious behavior. For college students and the general population, means of weighted and unweighted correlations between intelligence and the strength of religious beliefs ranged from −.20 to −.25 (mean r = −.24). Three possible interpretations were discussed. First, intelligent people are less likely to conform and, thus, are more likely to resist religious dogma. Second, intelligent people tend to adopt an analytic (as opposed to intuitive) thinking style, which has been shown to undermine religious beliefs. Third, several functions of religiosity, including compensatory control, self-regulation, self-enhancement, and secure attachment, are also conferred by intelligence. Intelligent people may therefore have less need for religious beliefs and practices.

A link to the meta-analytic study can be found here. The meta-analysis (an analysis of many studies of the same issue), which apparently looked at almost a century of data, found a negative correlation between IQ level and religiosity.

Here's another interesting study by the Pew Research Center, showing that atheists and agnostics are generally more knowledgeable about religion than religious people. In this study, Americans were given a religious knowledge quiz of 32 questions and, surprise surprise, atheists and agnostics had the highest scores.

The conclusion is inescapable: atheists and agnostics are generally smarter than their religious peers. That doesn't mean that they are right. But the data is what it is. .

The Cognitively Dissonant Mind of the Religious Apologist

From my experience, having observed a lot of religious apologetics, the mind of the religious apologist is frequently prone to cognitive dissonance and close-mindedness with respect to matters of religion. The mind of the religious apologist is a mind prone to reflexively defend a religious position without first thoroughly examining the relevant evidence. In the apologist the tribalistic mentality of man is on full display. The mind of the religious apologist is frequently not so concerned with sincere truth-seeking as it is concerned with defending the values of the tribe. Intellectual tensions are swept under the rug in an effort to conform with the religious tribe. The following video is a good example of how cognitive dissonance and a tendency to close-mindedness can operate in even very educated and smart apologists. Watch what the world-class synthetic chemist and Christian James Tour says in 12:30 - 14:00 of this video. It is cringeworthy. He relates how he tells Nabeel  Qureshi to repent for sincerely thinking about important questions pertaining to the veracity of the Bible; Tour reminds him that "every word in this book is true," and so Qureshi "has some repenting to do." Thereafter they both get on their knees, and Tour leads Qureshi to "repent" for not "taking every word in [the Bible] to be true." At this point I am just facepalming. Imagine grovelling on the floor asking the supremely rational entity to be forgiven for sincerely seeking truth!

What in the world? I say again: what in the world? Apparently the "lesson" that Tour gave Qureshi was to be close-minded. You see, for many a religious apologist, sincerely questioning the veracity of a religious text, by entertaining good arguments on the other side, is unacceptable. Even polymath Christian apologists like William Lane Craig are on record saying that lay Christians should just read Christian apologetic works, and leave works arguing against Christianity to trained individuals like himself (though I forget the link). The implicature is that for Craig, a lay Christian's reading the best works for and against Christianity is to unnecessarily and perilously infect himself with pernicious ideas! You see, in his mind he already has the truth, and so lay Christians should just read what conforms to his opinions about the truth. This is very cringeworthy. If you want to sincerely seek the truth about a certain issue X, then you should read the best arguments for and against X. Don't just read books in favor of Christianity if you are a Christian--read the arguments of atheists, agnostics, Muslims, etc. God gave you a mind, and so he intended you to use it. You have an obligation to follow the evidence wherever it leads--even if it leads you outside the precincts of your tribe. At the end of the day if you do your best to try to get at the truth, then you are not culpable if you get some things wrong. We are all human beings. None of us is infallible. And each one of us probably has some sincerely held justified or unjustified beliefs that are false. Do not be cowed by the religious tribalist who threatens you with eternal perdition, as if he is the gatekeeper of Hell. If you try your best to believe what is true and act in an upright manner, you will inherit the Kingdom of Heaven, whether you be an atheist, Buddhist, Jew, Hindu, etc. The maximally great being is all-just and all-loving. So don't be afraid of using your mind as best and as honestly as you can. And don't repent to anyone for doing so!

A Simple Argument Against the Incarnation

I just thought of a simple argument against the Christian dogma of the incarnation. Here it is:

1.       If it is possible that there is something that has two natures, then it is possible that there is something that has a potentially infinite number of natures.

2.       But it is not possible that there is something that has a potentially infinite number of natures.

3.       Therefore, it is impossible that there is something that has two natures.

4.       Therefore, it is impossible for the Christian doctrine of the incarnation to be true.

I think premise (1) is obviously true. The crux of the argument lies with premise (2). Is it impossible that something have a potentially infinite number of natures? Is it impossible for something to have something like 10^10000000000000000 natures? It honestly seems like it to me, but I admit that this is just an intuition. Premise (2) seems reasonable to me. So, since the argument is logically valid, (3) and (4) follow. But there is a problem for the orthodox Christian here, since he is committed to the truth of (~4). He believes that the second person of the Trinity, the Logos assumed a second human nature unto his divine person in the incarnation.

What is the solution here? I do not know the solution. I think the Christian's best bet is to deny (2), and claim that the divine persons could, if they so wanted, incarnate in a potentially infinite amount of types of things—i.e., that they could take on a potentially infinite amount of natures. So perhaps panentheism is possibly true, something which I am not sure is consistent with orthodox Christian theology. But I suppose that someone may respond by saying that the divine persons cannot take on non-rational natures, but only rational natures, and so it's not the case that panentheism is possibly true—rocks could never be hypostatically united to the Godhead. So while it may be true that a divine person could take on a potentially infinite number of natures, those natures would have to be rational natures.

In any case, I cannot help but think that the critic of orthodox Christianity is well within his epistemic rights in thinking that this argument is sound, even if it is ultimately unsound. Of course, this, as well as many such prima facie eminently reasonable arguments against orthodox Christianity, may be problematic for the perhaps overly exuberant orthodox Christian evidentialist.

I should add that I have left nature undefined here, and just intend it to pick out whatever we commonsensically take to be a nature, which is probably something like a Finean or Aristolelian essence. Now how something can have two such essences or natures is not even something that I can frankly even conceptualize. But perhaps the reader can help me out here.