Universalism? Some Really Bad People Don't Seem To Ever Change

I am very sympathetic to the universalist position which says that at the end of the day all human beings will enter heaven, even if only after aeons of purgation (whether this view is compatible with Catholicism is another story). But at the same time empirically I know some people who don't change their wicked ways, no matter what happens to them or how much loving help they receive. I know some people who have had really traumatic things happen to them, things which should have changed them for the better, but they still continue on in their wickedness and show no inclination to change for the better. I am not confident that for such people extending their existence for aeons will incline them to change for the better, rather than for the worse. The disturbing fact is that there are some truly devilish people out there who simply don't seem like they'll ever change. But at the same time I know that God's capacity to change even the most darkened of hearts is not bound by my concievability. In the end, it seems to me that since God is a maximally great being, his love will pursue us forever. And who can run away from the love of God forever?

Must Any Omnipotent and Omniscient Entity be Omnibenevolent?

It seems plausible to me that any entity that is omnipotent and omniscient has to be omnibenevolent.

Here's my reasoning: I think every person qua person is at least mildly inclined towards that which he believes is the morally best choice (where 'best choice' here is defined as a choice such that there is no better). To be sure, this inclination may be very small, and it is certainly overcome in many of us by overriding inclinations, but it is nonetheless there. So any omnipotent and omniscient agent OO, qua personal agent, has to have this inclination as well. Now what are things that can cause a person's inclination to that which one thinks is best to be overridden? It seems to me that it is either (i) ignorance, (ii) passions, (iii) coercion, or (iv) desire for personal gain. (Help me out if you think there is something else).

My inclination to do that which I think the best choice may be overridden by my inclination to not do it because of ignorance -- I may falsely believe there is a better choice. Bob's inclination towards being faithful to his spouse may be overridden by his (sexual) passions to sleep with his physically attractive colleague. Mary's inclination to tell the police what she saw at a crime scene may be overcome by peer pressure or coercion from her criminal friends. Judge Stephen's inclination to render an impartial verdict in a very public court case may be swayed by his desire for fame (personal gain). All of these things may cause our inclination to that which is best, which we have by nature, to be overridden. But the thing is that none of (i) - (iv) can override OO's inclination to do that which is best. He cannot choose something under the mistaken impression that it is the best choice because he, by stipulation, cannot be mistaken -- he is omniscient. This entity also cannot be subject to his passions because he is omnipotent. Furthermore, it seems that any omnipotent and omniscient being has to be immaterial anyways, and so won't be subject to passions (any material entity will be subject to physical laws and will have his capacity for knowledge limited by physical constraints). And obviously an omnipotent being cannot be coerced, or be subject to peer pressure. And with respect to personal gain, an omnipotent being already has everything he needs, so he won't act out of personal gain. So any omnipotent and omniscient being OO has to be omnibenevolent as well -- i.e., any such being has to be all good. Q.E.D.

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The following is a good representation of the argument in a numbered-premise-to-conclusion format:

1. Any agent A has an inclination towards that which it perceives to be morally best.

2. Any agent that is omnipotent and omniscient has no overriding inclinations against doing that which it perceives to be morally best.

3. If (1) and (2), then any omnipotent and omniscient agent would be omnibenevolent.

Therefore:

4. Any omnipotent and omniscient agent is omnibenevolent.